This paper analyses the impact of information on international portfolio investments. We decompose information into two categories: information that is observable by investors from all countries (homogeneous), and information that differs in contents between countries (heterogeneous information).
In the homogeneous information set we include general characteristics such as the size of the economy and its financial market, and readily available indicators that categorize the prevailing legal environment and the corporate governance structure of firms in the country. We also include information on how intensively information intermediaries tend to monitor firms in that country.
Finding proxies for the flow of heterogeneous information is more challenging. Following previous studies we use the geographic distance that should be inversely related to unintentional transmission of pieces of information that may turn out to be significant, and also a variable that proxies the commitment of informational resources connected to trade in goods between the countries.
Using comprehensive data on the aggregate country allocation of portfolio investments, we find that the measures of the size of the financial market by far dominates all other variables in the homogeneous information set. However, we also show that what we regard as a proxy for heterogeneous information explains a substantial incremental part of how investors allocate their portfolio investment across foreign markets. These results are robust to alternative samples, and the choice of the reference world portfolio.
I.

Introduction
This paper uses a comprehensive data set on international portfolio investments to investigate the role of information in explaining the country allocation of these investments. The paper relates to the growing literature on "home bias", the observation that investors exhibit a strong bias towards domestic and near-by stocks.
Specifically, this paper contributes to the segment of this literature that emphasize the role of information asymmetry as an important indirect barrier that leads to large distortions in investment patterns away from what is predicted by portfolio theory.
We provide new empirical evidence that relates to the impact of information on the country allocation of international portfolio investments. On a crude level we differentiate between homogeneous information that is available on equal terms to portfolio investors from all countries on one hand, and heterogeneous information, the contents of which differ depending on the investor's country of residence, on the other. In the homogeneous information group are variables like the relative size of the economy and the financial market 1 . The heterogeneous information group contains proxies for information that is transmitted in specific relationships between the two countries.
Our results show that favorable homogeneous information, systematically tend to increase investments from other countries. After controlling for the equity market size we find that investors invest a larger fraction of their total portfolio in rich countries 1 The gravity of the size of the financial market also impacts the corporate governance structure and firm level information that is compiled, analyzed, and disseminated abroad by financial analysts.
with well-developed financial markets than in poor countries. As stressed in earlier empirical research, this is consistent with more reliable information being produced about firms in a larger capital market. Investors' overweight large and more visible stocks, both domestic and foreign, in their portfolios. Kang and Stulz (1997) , and Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) among others document that foreign investors bias their country portfolios towards large stocks.
Once we control for the size of the financial market variables that proxy the quality of corporate governance have only a marginal influence on the level of foreign investments. In line with existing literature, we interpret this as evidence that the level of information disclosure that is closely related to prevailing corporate governance structures is largely reflected in the size of the market.
This paper also evaluates the role of financial analysts in explaining the fraction of the total investments that investors allocate to different foreign markets. Our result indicates that this type of information flow is strongly correlated with market size.
Nevertheless, the variable receives the expected sign, and is statistically significant in our regression along with a measure of the market size. We find that the fraction of portfolio investments that investors invest in foreign countries is directly related to the average number of analysts following and is inversely related to the forecast error and the dispersion of their recommendations.
These results lead us to conclude that the dominant homogeneous indicator of what drives international investments is simply the size of the capital market. At least to some extent the size of the financial market is a consequence of either a virtuous or a vicious circle resulting from the interplay between the quality of corporate governance structures, the informational environment, and the valuation of firms. A good corporate governance structure leads to more reliable information being produced by the firm which leads to smaller spreads and higher liquidity which in turn triggers more intense analysts' following that eventually feeds back in the form of better corporate governance and higher share prices.
Turning to what we categorize as heterogeneous information, we use a new variable that proxies for the flow of information that is not directly related to the stock market.
What we try to capture is the flow of information that transpire as a result of established trading relationships between the investor's country of residence and the target country. Our result provides convincing evidence that the volume of trade in goods has a sizable impact on how investors allocate their investments in foreign markets. The effect from this variable clearly dominates the pure proximity effect that we measure by distance. We conjecture that the dissemination of information that is required for efficient trading in tangible goods between two countries also provides investors with information that has a positive impact on their portfolio investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II, contains a summary of the relevant literature. Section III briefly describes the data. In section IV we introduce our regression model and describe the variable that we use to measure the country allocation of foreign investments. The measurement of our information variables is also explained. Section V presents our results and demonstrates their robustness to the use of alternative samples, and to the choice of reference world portfolio. In section VI, we summarize the main findings of this paper.
II. Related Literature
A large number of empirical studies document that investors exhibit a strong bias towards domestic stocks, for example French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) . 2 A number of recent studies suggest that informational asymmetries between local and non-local investors, and visibility characteristics of the securities, see e.g. Kang and Stulz (1997) and Huberman (2001) , t distort investment patterns away from what is predicted by traditional portfolio theory. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that domestic portfolios of U.S. based mutual funds are biased towards near-by firms. This bias is larger for smaller, more leveraged and more localized firms. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that in addition to distance, the language of the annual reports and the cultural background of the CEO's of Finnish corporations play an important role in the equity selection of Finnish investors.
3
A recent strand of research attempts to explain the observed low levels of crossborder portfolio investment pattern with differences in prevailing legal, institutional, 2 A number of other explanations have been put forward in the financial literature. Some of these are: Inflation hedging motives Adler and Dumas (1983) , and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) , taxation and transaction costs Black (1974) , Stulz (1981) , and Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) , human capital Hedging (Baxter and Jermann (1997) . These explanations have not been able to reconcile the observed home bias. Uppal (1992) , Lewis (1999) , and Bartram and Dufey (2001) provide recent surveys on home bias. 3 There is also some evidence showing that geographic proximity seems to imply an informational advantage that show up in returns. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) examining U.S. mutual funds show that fund managers' bias their investments towards nearby equities and in the process earn substantial abnormal returns. Hau (2001) analyzing data from the electronic trading system Xetra of the German and financial market characteristics of different countries, and with the manner in which these differences shape the respective corporate governance structures. A wellestablished fact is that widely dispersed corporate ownership in a Berle and Means sense is not common even in most developed countries. La Porta et al. (1998), and Claessens et al. (2000) , among others, document that in many developed countries and in most developing countries large controlling owners and a few families control a substantial part of the publicly listed market capitalization. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2002) , show that the observed home bias in U.S. investor's portfolios is strongly related to the presence of controlling local shareholders in foreign markets.
This literature 4 convincingly documents that in countries with weak protection of minority shareholders ownership structures with controlling shareholders tend to be more prevalent. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) observe that an important aspect of the efficiency of the corporate governance system in a country is the availability and credibility of information. They argue that the frequency of concentrated ownership and the degree of respect for minority shareholder rights is reflected in the extent to which information is made available to minority shareholders. Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002) argue that minority investors' ability to monitor (and discipline) management's behavior is a function of both the governance structure of the firm and the amount of information that is made available to them.
Higher extraction of private benefits by insiders will reduce the firm's willingness to Security Exchange show that German professional traders obtain a significantly higher return than foreign traders do. 4 See for example La Porta et al. (1998) .
disclose relevant and accurate information to minority shareholders. This will bread a poor information environment that will make it costly for investors to acquire and analyze information. Ultimately this makes it more difficult to predict cash flows, and also to monitor the management of the firm. The unavailability of accurate information will lead investors to ignore a firm as an investment object or at least to substantially limit its weight in their portfolio.
Recent research also establishes a direct link between the accounting system, the firms' informational environment, and the home bias. Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2002) conjecture: "Given the importance of accounting in providing information regarding the firm, managers could potentially use the accounting system to mitigate the informational factors that cause the home bias."
Another widely used proxy for a firm's information environment is its analyst following. Financial analysts play an important role in the information refinement for investment decisions by market participants. Bushman and Smith (2000) note that "financial analysts facilitate the interpretation and dissemination of the information provided by accounting information data, amplifying the economic benefits of a high quality accounting regime". To this end, they are the most important information intermediaries who provide processing and certification services to help market participants make their investment decisions.
Chang, Khanna, and Krishna (2000) provide international evidence that ownership concentration (and its resulting poorer information environment) has a substantial impact of the information environment of firms. They demonstrate empirically that countries with firms that exhibit lower degree of ownership concentration and a higher level of minority shareholder protection attract a larger number of analysts.
Their results indicate that the forecast accuracy of the analysts has an inverse relationship to ownership concentration and is directly related to the level of minority shareholder protection.
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These results are consistent with a number of earlier studies. Dempsey (1989) argues that the number of analysts following a security provides a good proxy for information availability. He notes that in a cost-benefit framework, analysts' coverage will increase with reduced information gathering costs. Schipper (1991) argues that analysts have incentives to direct their information acquisition resources towards firms with good prospects. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with a more forthcoming information disclosure attract a larger number of analysts who are in turn able to provide the market with more accurate forecasts of the firm's future prospects.
They also find that for these firms the forecasts are less dispersed among individual analysts and exhibit smaller revisions on an average.
For publicly listed firms there are other sources of information from which an agile investor can pick up on the prospects of these firms than the standard sources for public information. How likely an investor is to pick up this other type of information will depend on the frequency by which the investor is exposed to news concerning the environment in which the firm is operating. Along these lines Aba Al-Khail (2002) 5 They also find that the number of analysts and their forecast accuracy is positively related to the notes that the information flow related to trade in tangible goods also contains information on potential investment objects in the trading partner's country.
International trade requires effective channels of communication that facilitates reliable cross border transmission of asset specific information, information on the market conditions as well as the functioning of organizations and institutions that support the trading activity. 6 The intensity of trading in tangible goods between two countries should proxy for the level of commitment of resources, financial and otherwise, to transmission of information.
Trade influences the mode, intensity, and richness of information transfer between trading partners in a number of ways. More trade between two countries imply more intense day-to-day information flow between them. A broadening of the information flow will also expose the foreign investor to a larger pool of new potential investment opportunities in that country. On a deeper level, the experience gained through trade allows for proper calibration of individual pieces of information, e.g. which pieces of information can be considered trustworthy and which not.
In summary, more foreign trade should lead to an increased weight for the foreign trading partner in the investor's international portfolio. In line with this argument, Merton (1987) notes that "Although the types of costs underlying the signaling and financial market size. 6 The finance literature provides a number of examples that stresses the importance and relevance of non-return based information on the performance of equity assets. For Example, Barry and Brown (1985) note: "In some cases, information might be measured by the number of available historical returns. In others, it might have to do with some measure of the number of security analysts actively producing recommendations regarding the security, and in still other cases, information might be measured by some indicator of the extent of disclosure in a firm's published financial records. Whatever the measure, if less information is available about some securities, then these securities may have grater perceived risk." differential information models would surely be an important part of a more-detailed information-cost structure…, there is another type of cost that logically proceeds them: namely, the cost of making investors aware of the firm. That is for party A to convey useful information to party B, requires not only that Party A has a transmitter and sends an accurate message, but also that Party B has a receiver." Using this terminology an expansion of international trade between two countries usually imply the establishing of new active receivers on both sides of the transaction.
III. Data Description
The data on the country allocation of international portfolio (equity) investments for twenty-nine countries that we use in our empirical analysis is from the International capitalization is from Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2002) . Analyst coverage data is from Chang, Khanna, and Krishna (2000) . Corporate governance and accounting efficiency proxy variables is from La Porta et al. (1998) .
IV. Information in International Portfolio Investments
To address the role of information in explaining the share that the country receives of the international portfolio investments from other countries we formulate a simple multivariate regression model. For all our sample countries we measure the share of the aggregate investment portfolio (domestic + foreign) that is invested into specific foreign countries. In other words we are trying to explain the foreign country allocations of investments for our sample countries. These country allocations are regressed on variables that we use to proxy homogeneous and heterogeneous information.
We decompose the homogeneous information variables into two groups. The first group measures information that is related to the size of the economy and the development level of its financial market. For this group we use three variables. The first is the market capitalization of the target country as a fraction of the capitalization of world financial markets. Portes and Rey (1999) and Aba Al-Khail (1999 and show that the equity market size appears to contain significant information that shapes the gross flows of international portfolio investments. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that larger markets have more informative prices. Brennan and Cao (1997) find that foreign investors do not appear to face any informational disadvantage when investing in a large capital market. Falkenstein (1996) finds that after controlling for conventional risk proxies, US mutual funds prefer liquid and large stocks. He equates these preferences with asymmetry in information availability between the large stocks and small stocks. Merton (1987) argues that investors hold shares in firms with which they are more familiar and the average investor tend to be more exposed to information concerning large firms. Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors hold shares of larger firms. Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) find that foreign investors exhibit a strong preference towards the largest among Swedish stocks.
The second variable that we use is the per capita gross domestic product, per capita GDP, of the investor's home country. This variable captures the feature that investors in richer countries are more investment savvy, have more resources to gather information on international markets, and are more aware of the benefits of international diversification.
The third variable is the per capita GDP of the target country. Firms in countries with a high GDP per capita tend to have a longer experience of the importance of keeping investors satisfied. This variable is thus likely to be related to the prevailing corporate governance system in the country, which will be discussed in detail below.
Our second group of variables consists of information that is related to the corporate governance structure of firms and the legal environment of the target country. In this group we include the ratio of closely held shares of firms in the country as a measure of ownership concentration. An important aspect of the efficiency of the corporate governance system in a country is the availability and credibility of information. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) the frequency of concentrated ownership and the degree of respect for minority shareholder rights determine the extent to which information is made available to minority shareholders. Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002) claim that minority investors' ability to monitor (and discipline) the management is a function of both the governance structure of the firm and the amount of information that is made available to them. They argue that high is the insiders' private benefits make these insiders reluctant to disclose relevant and accurate information to minority shareholders. Substantial private benefits consequently lead to a poor information environment that will have an adverse effect on investors' interest in directing their resources for acquiring and analyzing information and ultimately the ability to predict cash flows, and monitor management actions. In many cases the lack of accurate information on a security will induce the investor to ignore that security.
We employ a number of proxies that are widely used in financial research for the legal environment and the corporate governance structure of the target country. These variables, which are taken from La Porta et al. (1997) are:
1. Anti-director rights. This index to provides an aggregate measure of minority shareholders rights. This scale ranges from 0 (countries with the lowest antidirector rights) to 6. The third group of commonly available information is related to analysts' following of firms in the target country. We use the number of analysts' following the largest firms in the country as a proxy for information availability concerning potential investments in a country. We measure the number of analysts' as the average number of those that provide annual earnings forecast for the top 30 firms in each country. Dempsey (1989) argues that the number of analysts following a security provides a good proxy for the extent of information availability. He notes that given the benefits of analysts' coverage l stocks with lower information gathering cost will be more extensively covered. Schipper (1991) argues that analysts' coverage also has a forward looking element attached to it. Analysts do have incentives to direct their information acquisition resources towards firms with good prospects.
We also employ two measures, the forecast error, and the forecast dispersion, to capture the interaction between the number of analysts' and the accuracy of their forecasts. 7 We measure the forecast error as the absolute value of the analysts' forecast error deflated by actual earnings per firm, averaged in each country, and the forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts of the individual earnings forecasts deflated by actual earnings per firm, averaged in each country. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with a more informative and credible information environment attract a larger number of analysts that are in turn able to provide the market with more accurate forecasts on the firms' future prospects. They also find that for these firms the forecasts are less dispersed among individual analysts and exhibit lower revisions volatility.
All the above variables are available to investors all over the world independent of the investor's home country. However, all relevant information concerning the future prospects of a firm is not being published on a pre-announced date in standardized form Information that is of occasional nature will reach some investors first and other investors later. This is the type of information that we call heterogeneous-The
Forecast error (t) = Absolute {[actual EPS(t) -Estimated(t)]/[actual EPS(t)]} and Forecast Dispersion (t) = {[standard deviation of analysts EPS forecasts (t)]/absolute value [mean analysts EPS forecasts (t)]
}, where EPS is earning per share. Number of analysts, forecast error, and forecast dispersion are measured on the eleventh month of the fiscal year. For example, the forecast error for the firms with December 1996 year-end is |Actual annual earnings in December 1996 -the annual earnings forecast consensus at November 1996| divided by the Actual annual earnings in December 1996. In measuring forecast dispersion, observations with less than three analysts' forecasts are eliminated. For more details on the calculation of these variables, see Chang, Khanna, and Krishna (2000) .
variables that we use to capture this type of information will actually measure the expected lag between the triggering event and the reception of the information by an average investor in a given country. The more intense the use of relevant communication channels the shorter this expected lag.
We construct a new variable to proxy for the information flow resulting from trading intangible goods between countries. This variable measures the relative importance of the trading relationship between the investors' home country and the target country. two countries, the more intense is the day to day information flow between them and the more will existing local information advantages be decimated.
Our second variable that captures heterogeneous information addresses the information asymmetry produced by the proximity of investors and their investment objects. Specifically, we use the distance between financial capitals of the home and target countries to capture any information advantage the countries have on foreign equity in close by countries. A large number of empirical studies document that investors exhibit a strong bias towards domestic and near-by stocks. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that domestic portfolios of U.S. based mutual funds are skewed towards near-by firms. They further find that this bias is larger for smaller, more leveraged and more localized firms. Furthermore Moskowitz (2001), and Hau (2001) present evidence that geographic proximity leads to an informational advantage that results in a better predictability of future performance.
V. Results
We begin this section by looking at the relationship between our aggregate country allocation variable and size of the target asset market as well as the degree of show that the number of analysts, their forecast accuracy, and forecast dispersion is statistically significant and appears in the regression with the expected signs.
As we explain in the previous sections, the size of the financial market is at least partly the consequence of the interplay between the quality of corporate governance structures, the informational environment, and the valuation of firms. A good corporate governance structure leads to more reliable information being produced by the firm which leads to smaller spreads and higher liquidity which in turn triggers more intense analysts' following which feeds back in the form of better corporate governance and higher share prices.
We next turn to what is the main focus of this research which is what we call heterogeneous information. This is value relevant information from the target country that varies depending on the investor's home country. Panels A.1 through A.3 of Table 2 presents the results of the regression for the relationship between country allocation of the equity portfolio and our variable for the mass of information as a consequence of the trading relationship between the target country and the investor's home country. These results show that even after controlling for size, corporate governance variables, and information intermediaries' variables, the intensity of the trading relationship displays a strong positive statistically significant influence. The overall fit of the regression increases by twenty-eight (28) percent moving from 35% to 45%. In addition this variable seems to pickup most of the individual effects of the target country corporate governance and information intermediaries' variables. The only variables that continue to be significant are the target country market size and its % of the listed equities that is closely held.
As we explained earlier in this paper, these are only variables that indirectly measure the flow of heterogeneous information between investors and a target country. What we do know from earlier studies is that the direct distance between the investors' home country and target countries seems to provide a reasonable proxy of this type of information. We also know that distance is an important determinant of tangible goods trading pattern between countries. Therefore a potential concern is that our results for the important role of the trading relationship could simply reflect the distance separating the investor's home country from the target country. If distance is highly inversely correlated with the volume of tangible goods trade, then tangible goods trade may simply proxy for distance.
To address this concern, we augment our regression with the direct distance between the financial centers of the investors' home country and the target countries. Panels B.1 through B.3 of table 3 provide a strong support that refutes such a conjecture. The results confirm the negative and statistically significant role of the distance variable and the same time reaffirms the significant role of the trade relationship.
Another concern is that our trade variable is not significantly different from the information that is captured by the share of exports or imports between the investors' home and target countries. Panels C.1 and C.2 of table 2 provide evidence that our variable measuring information from trade relationship provides superior explanatory power when compared with more basic forms of proxies for bilateral trading in tangible goods.
VI. Summary
We use a comprehensive international data on the aggregate level of portfolio investments to evaluate the impact of information on the pattern of the prevailing home bias. We separate information into two categories: information that is identically observable by investors from all countries, and information that may differ between individual countries.
We further divide the homogeneous information set into information relating to the size of the economy and its financial market, information resulting from the prevailing legal environment and the corporate governance structure of firms in a country, and information that is a consequence of analysts' following of firms in the country. We identify and evaluate the impact of two proxies for flow of heterogeneous information, information that is a by-product of the flow of trade related information between countries, and information flow that will be held back by spatial separation between the countries.
We find that the information resulting from the size of the financial market by far dominates all other variables in the homogeneous information set. We suggest that the size of the financial market is in part a consequence of either a virtuous or a vicious circle resulting from the interplay between the quality of corporate governance structures, the informational environment, and the valuation of firms. A good corporate governance structure leads to more reliable information being produced by the firm which leads to smaller spreads and higher liquidity which in turn triggers more intense analysts' following which feeds back in the form of better corporate governance and higher share prices. In other words financial markets are subject to a network effect. More firms that provide attractive investment objects will attract more investors which in turn will make it easier also for other firms to obtain funding partly through improvements in the techniques for handling asymmetric information problems.
We also show that our proxy for the heterogeneous information accounts for a substantial amount of how investors allocate their portfolio investment across foreign markets. These results are robust to alternative sample selection and the choice of reference world portfolio. 
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This table reports parameter coefficients, White corrected standard error (in parenthesis) and adjusted R 2 for the regressions in which the dependent variable is the fraction of the country portfolio equity investments relative to the total portfolio (domestic and foreign). The independent variables are a constant, world market portfolio: the target country weight of the stock market capitalization as fraction of the world stock markets capitalization, Ln(per capita GDP "home country"): the per capita GDP of the investors country in natural logarithmic form, Ln(per capita GDP "target country"): per capita GDP of the target country in natural logarithmic form, % of market closely held: the percentage of the equity market of the target country that is closely held, anti-director rights: an index that provides an aggregate measure of minority shareholders rights with a scale ranging from 0 (countries with the lowest anti-director rights) to 6, efficiency of the judicial system: a variable measuring the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment" with a scale ranging from 0 (lowest efficiency) to 10. Corruption: a variable that measures the level of corruption in a government with a scale ranging from 0 (the highest level of corruption) to 10. Risk of Expropriation: an index measuring the risk of "outright confiscation" and "forced nationalization" that investors face in a country with a scale ranging from 0 (the highest risk) to 10, Rating of accounting standards: a variable providing a percentile rating of the accounting system and its disclosure features of firms in a country with a scale ranging from 0 (the worst) to 100, number of analysts': a proxy of the information availability on and the attractiveness of the firms in country (j) measured as the average number of analysts' providing annual earnings forecast for the top 30 firms in each country, analysts' EPS forecast error: the absolute value of the analysts' forecast error deflated by actual earnings per firm, averaged in each country, more specifically Forecast error (t) = Absolute {[actual EPS(t) -Estimated(t)]/[actual EPS(t)]}, and analysts' EPS forecast dispersion: the standard deviation of earnings forecasts of the individual earnings forecasts deflated by actual earnings per firm, averaged in each country, more specifically Forecast Dispersion (t) = {[standard deviation of analysts EPS forecasts (t)]/absolute value [mean analysts EPS forecasts (t)]}, where EPS is earning per share. Number of analysts, forecast error, and forecast dispersion are measured on the eleventh month of the fiscal year. For example, the forecast error for the firms with December 1996 year-end is |Actual annual earnings in December 1996 -the annual earnings forecast consensus at November 1996| divided by the Actual annual earnings in December 1996. In measuring forecast dispersion, observations with less than three analysts' forecasts are eliminated. The corporate governance variables are from La Porta et al. (1998) , and the analysts' variables are from Chang, Khanna, and Krishna (2000) . 
